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This document analyzes the proportionality of drug related 
crimes in seven Latin American countries through the 
study of the evolution of their criminal legislations from 
1950 until 2012. The study suggests the existence of a 
regional tendency to maximize the use of criminal law for 
combating this type of conducts. This is reflected in: i) the 
gradual increase in the number of drug-related conducts 
described as criminal, ii) the exponential growth of the 
penalties with which those conducts are punished and iii) 
the incomprehensible tendency of punishing with more 
severity the drug-related crimes rather than those more 
evidently severe such as homicide, rape and aggravated 
robbery. Those upward trends indicate that the Latin 
American States have become addicted to punishment 
because of their frequent and empirically groundless 
increasing of the punitive dose, regardless of its constantly 
decreasing benefits. 
Addicted to punishment is part of a series of studies 
carried out by the Research Consortium on Drugs and 
the Law (CEDD) that critically analyze the application of 
the proportionality principle in relation with drug crimes. 
The studies find that the punishments imposed and the 
punitive treatment of the offenders are disproportional, 
often generating more damages than benefits. 
About the CEDD
The Research Consortium on Drugs 
and the Law (Colectivo de Estudios 
Drogas y Derecho, CEDD) brings 
together researchers from seven Latin 
American countries with the goal of 
analyzing the impact of criminal law and 
legal practice surrounding illicit drugs. 
The CEDD seeks to foster a debate 
about the effectiveness of the current 
drug policies and recommends policy 
alternatives that are more balanced and 
effective.
About Dejusticia
The Center for the Study of Law, 
Justice and Society participates 
actively in debates on law, institutions 
and public policies, drawing upon 
rigorous studies and undertaking 
actions that promote social inclusion, 
democracy and human rights in 
Colombia and Latin America. The Drug 
Policy area, which is part of the Rule of 
Law research field, aims to influence the 
national and regional debate regarding 
drug policies using socio legal studies 
that promote a rights and democracy-
based approach to the drug problem. 
The Dejusticia Working Papers are 
short essays that present arguments 
and proposals based on studies that 
seek to contribute to academic and 
civil society debates on topics of 
public interest.
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In Latin America, trafficking cocaine so it can be sold to someone who 
wants to use it is more serious than raping a woman or deliberately killing 
your neighbor. While it may seem incredible, that is the conclusion of a 
rigorous study of the evolution of criminal legislation in the region, which 
shows that countries’ judicial systems mete out harsher penalties for traf-
ficking even modest amounts of drugs than for acts as heinous as sexual 
assault or murder.1
How have we reached such an unjust and irrational point? In recent 
decades, especially the 1980s, Latin American countries, influenced by an 
international prohibitionist model, fell – ironically – into what we might 
metaphorically call an addiction to punishment.
Addiction2 creates the need to consume more and more drugs, which 
have less and less effect; ultimately, the problematic user simply consumes 
drugs to avoid withdrawal. Drug legislation in Latin America seems to have 
followed a similar path. Countries have an ever-growing need to add crimes 
and increase the penalties for drug trafficking, supposedly to control an ex-
panding illegal market, while this increasingly punitive approach has less and 
less effect on decreasing the supply and use of illegal drugs.
 1 To cite just a few examples, in Bolivia the maximum penalty is 25 years for 
drug trafficking and 20 years for murder, which means penalties are harsh-
er for trafficking drugs than for killing another person. In Colombia, the 
maximum penalty is 30 years for trafficking and 20 years for rape, which 
means that under Colombian law, it is more serious to traffic psychoactive 
substances for someone who purchases them voluntarily than to subject 
a woman to violence and rape her. Similar conclusions were reached in 
nearly all the Latin American countries we studied. 
 2 There is significant academic debate about the terms “addict” and “addic-
tion,” because they have acquired a negative political and moral connota-
tion. Although we use them here to reinforce the metaphor, we generally 
believe that the term “problematic drug user” is more appropriate. 
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So just as the problematic drug user faced with the declining effects of 
the drug automatically increases the frequency and amount consumed, pub-
lic officials, seeing the scant impact of growing punitive repression, increase 
the dose and frequency. And our countries become addicted to punishment, 
which explains the disproportionate laws that are discussed and document-
ed in this paper.
Over the past 60 years, this evolution has taken place within the con-
text of the so-called “war on drugs.”3 The dominant worldwide policy on 
“illegal drugs” has been their prohibition, an approach characterized by the 
use of criminal law as the basic tool for combating all phases of the business 
(cultivation, production, distribution and trafficking), and in some cases 
even drug use. With some nuances and significant variation, the legislation 
in every country in the world contains criminal provisions calling for impris-
onment for the distribution and trafficking of controlled substances.4
This is the result of a long global process that has had significant local 
manifestations. Following the terminology proposed by Boaventura de Sou-
sa Santos, this process can be characterized as globalized localism,5 because 
the cause and strategies of one particular country, in this case the United 
States, gradually became an international issue and gave rise to a significant 
body of legislation. Since the early 20th Century,6 but especially since the 
 3 The “war on drugs” refers to the policy promoted by former U.S. President 
Richard Nixon in the early 1970s to fight the growing use of illegal drugs 
at that time among young people in the United States. This is a “zero toler-
ance” policy that uses criminal law and force to crack down at all costs 
on the supply of and demand for these substances and punish anyone 
involved in any aspect of the business.
 4 on the global practice of punishing drug-related conducts with prison sen-
tences that tend to be harsh, Gloria Lai (2012: 3) says: “While most coun-
tries of the world have signed up to international (and for some, regional) 
agreements recognizing the principle of proportionality, they often do not 
incorporate the requirements of proportionality in their sentencing frame-
work of drug offences.”
 5 See Santos (1998: 57 and following pages).
 6 In 1909, the first international conference on the issue, the Shanghai 
Conference, was held to discuss the “harmful health consequences of 
opium.” The first international treaty, the International Opium Convention 
(The hague, 1912), drew on the main conclusion of the Shanghai con-
ference: to adopt strong regulation and control of opium production and 
distribution in domestic law. Controls were gradually strengthened in the 
Geneva Conventions of 1925; the International Convention for Limiting the 
Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of Narcotic Drugs, signed in 
Geneva in1931; the Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in 
Dangerous of 1936; and other treaties.
1960s,7 important international treaties have been adopted that form the 
legal basis for the prohibition of controlled substances. Before that, the in-
ternational drug control regime was liberal, in the sense that it did not re-
ally contain regulations that limited or prohibited their use, production and 
transshipment.8
This international prohibitionist legal framework has had a great local 
impact around the world, especially in Western countries. By approving and 
ratifying these treaties, countries agree to adjust their domestic laws to the 
prohibitions established in the treaties. As a result, countries’ national legis-
lation has gradually increased the use of criminal law in strategies for “com-
bating drugs.” This can also be characterized as localized globalism,9 because 
global regulation has had significant national and local impacts which have 
profoundly transformed the response to drug-related problems, with those 
responses increasing more repressive.
This tendency to use criminal law as a basic strategy for combating 
drugs merits careful analysis for several key reasons. First, it implies a ten-
dency to maximize the use of criminal law, contradicting the basic principle 
that criminal law should be a last resort.10 This basic guarantee implies that 
criminal sanctions can only be used when fully justified. Second, it can affect 
the basic rights and guarantees of a constitutional state, such as the guarantee 
of the proportionality of crime and punishment.
 7 Since the 1960s, three international treaties have established the prohi-
bitionist legal framework on drugs: 1) the Single Convention on Narcotic 
Drugs of 1961, which calls for coordinated international action to com-
bat drug abuse and trafficking; 2) the Convention on Psychotropic Sub-
stances of 1971, which establishes an international system for control of 
psychotropic substances, including synthetic drugs; and 3) the Conven-
tion against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 
1988, which adopts comprehensive measures to combat drug trafficking.
 8 As Jay Sinha (2001) notes, use of opium and coca, mainly as palliatives 
and tranquilizers, was generalized in the 19th Century in Canada, the Unit-
ed States, Europe and Australia. Because there was less medical and legal 
control over these drugs at that time, use was an individual decision that 
did not meet with social disapproval. 
 9 See Santos (1998: 57 and following pages).
 10  Criminal law experts Juan Bustos Ramírez and hernán hormazábal Ma-
larée (1997: 66) explain the principle of criminal law as a last resort as 
follows: “Criminal law must be understood as a last resort or, better yet, 
an extreme case. This means that the state can only turn to it when all 
other controls, both formal and informal, have failed. The seriousness of a 
criminal law response means that criminal law must only be considered an 
exceptional response to social conflict.” 
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This report explores whether the recent evolution of criminal legisla-
tion in Latin American countries with regard to drug-related conducts re-
spects these minimal guarantees to which criminal law should be subject, 
and especially whether that criminal legislation can be considered propor-
tionate to the harm caused by prohibited conducts. Ultimately, the question 
is whether the crimes and punishments outlined in national legislation are 
proportionate. If the answer is no, the conclusion should be that they may 
even be unconstitutional within the framework of a constitutional state.
To address this question, the report explores the recent development 
of criminal laws on drug-related crime in seven Latin American countries: 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Colombia, Peru and Mexico. These 
countries were chosen based on two basic criteria. First, they are of academ-
ic importance, because they have different drug-related problems, different 
geographic locations, diverse contexts and different political systems. Ac-
cording to traditional categorization, Colombia, Peru and Bolivia are consid-
ered producer countries; Mexico and even Brazil are considered transship-
ment countries.11 They also represent the different regions of Latin America, 
from the Southern Cone to the furthest Spanish-speaking country in North 
America.
Second, there is a key practical criterion, because they are the coun-
tries represented in the Colectivo de Estudios Drogas y Derecho (CEDD), the 
group that carried out this study, which seeks to identify the characteristics 
of drug policy in the continent and document its effects. This investigation is 
a component of the second phase of CEDD’s research, which focuses on ex-
ploring the proportionality of criminal legislation in those seven countries.12 
This comparative analysis contributes additional elements to discussion of 
the proportionality and reasonableness of prohibitionist drug policies.
 11 These traditional categories have been questioned recently, as the dy-
namics of the global drug business have undermined many of them. For 
example, while Colombia ranked as a drug producer in the 1990s, the 
increase in domestic use points to it also becoming a consumer country. 
For practical purposes, however, the classical categories mentioned are 
useful for identifying differences in the countries’ domestic situations with 
regard to drugs.
 12 For more about CEDD’s studies, see, among other works, reports by Meta-
al, P. and Youngers, C. (eds.) (2010) and Pérez Correa, C. (ed.) (2012). The 
individual reports about proportionality and drug laws in the seven coun-
tries studied by CEDD, are available at: http://www.wola.org/es/informes/
colectivo_de_estudios_drogas_y_derecho 
This report has three main parts. The first provides a conceptual and 
methodological overview of the elements that form the basis of the analysis. 
The second describes the principal recent trends in criminal drug legisla-
tion in Latin America. The third analyzes the proportionality of drug-related 
crimes and punishment in the countries, comparing them with penalties for 
other serious crimes, followed by some conclusions.
Conceptual and methodological overview
This section describes the concept of proportionality as used in this re-
port and how it is used to measure the proportionality of drug control leg-
islation. Before presenting the conceptual and methodological elements, 
however, an initial reflection is offered –essential for understanding the 
analysis– on the harm done by conducts that are defined in Latin America 
as crimes related to controlled substances.
Three key issues are the focus of this section. First is the issue of the 
legal interest supposedly protected by the definition of drug-related crime 
and the harm actually done by those conducts.13 Second, an explanation 
is provided on what is meant by proportionality and how it can be mea-
sured in criminal law. Finally, we discuss how proportionality is measured 
in drug-related crimes and penalties adopted in the seven selected coun-
tries in the past 60 years.
Protected legal interest and harm  
in drug-related crimes14
Before examining the proportionality of drug-related crimes, we must ask 
what legal interest15 is to be protected (bien jurídico tutelado) by the defini-
 13 Note about the English translation: This paper was written originally in 
Spanish and included concepts and language developed in Latin Ameri-
can criminal law, which correspond mainly to civil law tradition. Legal con-
cepts in the civil law tradition, which are widely used in Spanish, French or 
Italian, do not always have a precise English translation, because English 
legal terms are strongly linked to the common law tradition. We have there-
fore adjusted some terms in this English version, explaining those terms as 
necessary with the Spanish terms in parenthesis.
 14 This preliminary discussion draws on and develops elements previously 
discussed by the authors, particularly Uprimny, Guzmán and Parra (2012). 
 15 From here on, we draw on a guarantee-based concept of legal interests, 
which is not reduced to the content of criminal law, but which requires, 
as a necessary and sufficient condition, some sort of social agreement. 
In speaking of the “protected legal interest,” therefore, we refer to a guar-
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tion of the crime and what harm the law seeks to prevent or punish. This 
is crucial, because if drug policy is meant to address serious harm, it must 
be proportionately serious. If, however, drug policies seek to prevent or 
punish lesser harm, then it seems intuitively disproportionate to resort to 
such strict criminalization.
Drug policies rooted in the prohibitionist paradigm perpetuate the 
following logic: Because certain psychoactive substances are considered 
harmful and hazardous to public health, the goal is to avoid their use and 
abuse by criminalizing their production and commercialization. The basic 
purpose of drug policy, at least in its design, is related to public health, by 
keeping people from gaining access to psychoactive substances because of 
the harm their use could cause.
This is largely reflected in the criminal legislation of the selected 
countries, which states that public health is the legal interest protected 
by the definition of drug-related crimes. The criminal codes of Colombia, 
Mexico and Peru consider drug-related crimes to be crimes against public 
health. Other countries, such as Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia and Ecuador, 
where drug laws are independent of the Criminal Code, tend not to es-
tablish the legal interest being protected. Considering the context of these 
laws, however, it is possible to conclude that they also represent an at-
tempt to protect public health. In Brazil, for example, drug-related crimes 
were included in the Criminal Code until 1976, and during that time they 
were also included in the section on crimes against public health.
By resorting to criminal prohibition, however, drug policies have cre-
ated an illegal drug-trafficking market, with powerful organized criminal 
groups that have committed terrible crimes that affect all of our countries. 
This sometimes makes it difficult to identify the harm that drug policies 
are meant to prevent, as some analysts may focus on their primary objec-
tive, which is to protect public health, while others focus on instruments 
to combat drug trafficking, which is a result of prohibition.
antee-based concept like that explained by Bustos Ramírez, J. and hor-
mazábal Malarée, H. (1997: 58) based on Ferrajoli: “A theory of protected 
legal interests in a social and democratic state (…) is grounded in society 
and results from interactive processes within it. In a democratic state, they 
are the outcome of participatory debate, where the hegemony attained 
is willing to accept their future revision. The objects of protection, the le-
gal interests, stem from society and are therefore also subject to further 
democratic debate. They are therefore dynamic in nature.” 
To determine the legal interest that is actually protected by defining 
drug-related conducts – such as the cultivation, production and traffick-
ing of drugs – as crimes, it is important to draw a distinction between “pri-
mary problems” and “secondary problems” associated with illegal drugs 
or controlled substances. According to authors such as Louk Hulsman 
(1987) and Ethan Nadelmann (1992), the former are problems caused by 
the abuse of a psychoactive substance, while “secondary problems” result 
from prohibitionist policies.
One example illustrates that difference: cirrhosis caused by the ex-
cessive use of alcohol or lung cancer caused by smoking are “primary 
problems,” because they result from abuse of the substance. However, vio-
lence by organized criminal groups that control the production and distri-
bution of cocaine or HIV infection of heroin users who share needles are 
“secondary problems,” because they are directly related to the criminaliza-
tion of the production and use of those drugs.
Violence that tends to be associated with drug trafficking (or nar-
co-violence) is not really a result of the drugs themselves, but of prohi-
bitionist policies that tend to create large incentives for the formation of 
organized criminal groups that use violence to maintain their power in the 
drug business. In discussing the proportionality of drug-related crime and 
punishment, therefore, it is important to distinguish between what can 
actually be protected by the definition of drug-related crimes and what 
cannot.
We assume that the proportionality of drug policies should be evalu-
ated based on their primary purpose, which is to address public health 
problems directly associated with the possible abuse of certain drugs. 
From that standpoint, the harm to be considered in this analysis is the 
harm caused to the health of members of society by the use and distribu-
tion of controlled substances.
It could be argued that the definition of these crimes is meant to pro-
tect not only public health, but also such legal interests as personal integ-
rity and national security. Such an argument would assume that because 
drug production and trafficking result in deaths and affect public security, 
people who participate should face criminal prosecution.
As explained above, however, harm caused by or resulting from 
criminal activity that is organized around the drug business is a second-
ary, rather than a primary, problem, as it results from prohibition and the 
profits generated because of prohibition, not from the conducts of culti-
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vating, producing and distributing certain psychoactive substances. These 
legal interests are and must be protected by laws regarding other specific 
crimes, such as murder or personal injury.
Once the protected legal interest by which the proportionality of 
crime and punishment should be evaluated in the case of drug-related 
conducts is clarified, the harm must be more precisely defined. First, it 
must be determined what harm these conducts can actually produce, or 
the type of “wrongfulness” (antijuridicidad) that they can actually cause. 
Second is the determination of when the criminalization of a drug-related 
conduct, such as production or distribution, is justified.
It is clear that public health is a legal interest that merits protection. 
What is not so clear is that the production and distribution of psychoactive 
substances are serious threats to that legal interest, or that the definitions 
of crimes in the Latin American countries studied protect it adequately. 
The reason is that the criminalized conducts do not cause a specific harm, 
but create the risk that public health may be affected.
Transporting a certain quantity of drugs does not, in itself, cause spe-
cific harm to public health or to the individual health of a member of the 
community; it only creates the risk that a user’s health could be affected 
if he or she decided voluntarily to obtain and use those substances. From 
that standpoint, contributing to the cultivation, production distribution 
or trafficking of drugs does not directly affect an individual or collective 
legal interest. It could create a risk or encourage risky behavior, but it does 
not necessarily imply a specific hazard.
According to that reasoning, not all harm or risks to human health 
justify the criminalization of drug-related conducts. For example, the use 
of controlled substances by an adult who freely decides to do so should 
not be criminalized, as that is a conduct protected by the rights to privacy, 
self-determination and free will.
Colombia’s Constitutional Court established a legal rule when it 
decriminalized possession of a quantity of drugs for personal use, which 
is generally the philosophy of countries that have eliminated the crimi-
nalization of consumption or that seem to be moving in that direction.16 
 16 Latin American countries where drug use or possession for personal use 
has been decriminalized or that seem to be moving in that direction in-
clude Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and Uru-
guay. For more about decriminalization of the use and possession of drugs 
for personal use in various countries around the world, see Rosmarin and 
According to the court, consumption is a conduct protected by such fun-
damental rights as self-determination and personal autonomy. The state 
cannot punish such conduct because in a democratic order, only conducts 
that affect the rights of third parties can be criminally sanctioned. 17
In contrast, the criminalization of other conducts is justified in a 
democratic constitutional state because they affect the rights of third par-
ties. These include the distribution of controlled substances to minors, 
which could affect their psychological or physical development and, 
therefore, their health. For that reason, other people who participate in 
the production, distribution and trafficking of controlled substances can 
be punished criminally in a legitimate and proportionate manner.
When establishing proportionality between the harm done by the 
crime and the penalty determined by the Congress, it is therefore impor-
tant to remember that drug-related conducts that have been defined as 
crimes tend not to cause direct, specific harm. Only in the case of very 
few criminal conducts can specific, direct harm be proven; these include 
providing drugs to a minor, because the distribution of drugs to children 
and adolescents could affect the free development of their personalities.
In most definitions of crimes in Latin America, the wrongfulness to 
which they refer is generally an abstract risk of harm to human health. 
Because this risk refers to the right of third parties, criminal penalties can 
be justified, as long as they are proportionate and respect the basic guar-
antees offered to all people under criminal law.
Proportionality of punishment18
The principle of proportionality is fundamental in criminal law, because it 
refers to the guarantee of proportionality of punishment that dates back 
to the Enlightenment and is now enshrined in the Rule of Law. It is based 
on the principle of legality and is related to the prohibition of cruel, inhu-
man and degrading punishment as a guarantee for the protection of hu-
man dignity, which is established in various international human rights 
Eastwood (2012). 
 17 Colombian Constitutional Court, Sentence C-221 of 1994. M.P. Carlos Ga-
viria Díaz.
 18 In this discussion, we refer to the concept of abstract proportionality de-
veloped by authors in Uprimny, Guzmán and Parra (2012: 10 and following 
pages). 
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treaties,19 as well as in the constitutions of most of the countries included 
in the study.20 It is cruel and inhuman to punish a person with a penalty 
that is not reasonably proportionate to the seriousness of his or her action.
Despite the importance of this principle, it is difficult to establish 
objective criteria for determining the proportionality between the harm 
done and the punishment to be imposed. There must be an external le-
gitimacy –from being a moral and political problem -- for the penalty im-
posed in each case. A theoretical and methodological approach based on 
that of Ferrajoli (2000: pp. 398 and following pages) is used to analyze 
the proportionality of drug-related crimes and punishment in the selected 
Latin American countries.
According to Ferrajoli, analysis of the proportionality of punishment 
can be broken down into three sub-problems: 1) the legislative branch’s 
pre-determination of minimum and maximum penalties for each action, 
2) the judge’s determination of the penalty to be imposed in each specific 
case, and 3) post-determination, or enforcement of the penalty.
This paper focuses on the first of those sub-problems, which is re-
ferred to as abstract proportionality. This is the focus, rather than the 
other aspects, because abstract proportionality allows for the clearest and 
most efficient comparative analysis of the selected countries, as it is based 
on a review of existing criminal legislation. A comparative study of the 
penalties imposed and enforced would imply research costs and effort 
that could be – in the terms used in this study – “disproportionate.”
Two different approaches can be used to determine whether crimi-
nal legislation meets the criteria for proportionality. One is based on the 
theoretical principles proposed by various philosophers as criteria for de-
fining the minimum and maximum penalty for a particular offense. Fer-
 19 Norms of international law that provide legal support for the principle of 
proportionality include Articles 5 and 29(2) of the Universal Declaration of 
human Rights, Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, Article 5 of the American Convention on human Rights and Article 
49(3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union; it has 
been similarly developed in jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of 
human Rights and the European Court of human Rights. 
 20 Although most of the constitutions do not explicitly mention the principle 
of proportionality, but include constitutional guarantees similar to the pro-
hibition against cruel and inhuman punishment, some constitutions do 
refer to the principle. Article 22 of the Mexican Constitution states that “all 
penalties must be proportionate to the crime being punished and the legal 
right affected.” 
rajoli (2000: pp. 399 and following pages) notes two specific theoretical 
principles: the advantage of the crime must not be greater than the disadvan-
tage of the penalty; and the penalty must not be greater than the informal vio-
lence that the defendant would suffer, in its absence, by the aggrieved party or 
other more or less organized forces.
Pre-determination of the penalty can also be based on comparison 
with penalties for other crimes defined in criminal legislation, analyzing 
whether the punishment for a certain crime is disproportionate in com-
parison to penalties for other crimes of greater or equal seriousness. For 
purposes of this investigation, the latter option was chosen because it 
provides more empirical elements for analysis. Abstract proportionality 
therefore refers to the analysis of proportionality used in the first stage 
of the definition of the penalty, when the legislative branch determines 
punishable offenses and their corresponding sanctions.
Elements for measuring proportionality
The next step in the difficult task of determining whether criminal drug 
laws in Latin America are proportional is a comparative analysis of the 
penalties for drug-related crimes and other serious crimes that have a sig-
nificant social impact. For comparison, we have chosen murder, rape and 
aggravated robbery. This choice is based on the characteristics of these 
crimes, as all involve harm to protected legal rights: life, sexual freedom 
and integrity, and personal integrity and property. There is also a high rate 
of these crimes in Latin American countries, which makes comparison 
with drug-related crimes useful. If drug-related crimes are punished more 
severely than the others that would be evidence of disproportionality, be-
cause the seriousness of the crimes used for comparison is greater, or at 
least more obvious, than that of drug-related crimes.
One final point of clarification on the research methodology is in 
order. The original intent was to perform a differentiated analysis of the 
crime of trafficking, distinguishing between penalties for trafficking small 
quantities of drugs (micro-trafficking or street-level dealing) and traffick-
ing large amounts, which involves strong criminal organizations (macro-
trafficking). However, legislation in Latin America tends not to make this 
distinction, which demonstrates another element of disproportionality: 
The same type of penalty applies to two considerably different conducts, 
because, as we have unfortunately seen in the region, the potential harm 
associated with micro-trafficking is clearly less than the harm associated 
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with large-scale drug trafficking. Nevertheless, in some countries the pun-
ishment is equal, and in a few cases, a small-scale marihuana dealer is pun-
ished as if he were Pablo Escobar.
Before beginning the comparative analysis, the recent evolution of 
drug-related crimes should be examined. This preliminary analysis is use-
ful, as explained in greater detail below, as it reveals a tendency toward 
gradual increases, which could be a factor of disproportionality in itself, 
because in a democracy, the criminal punishment of any conduct should 
be the exception and should respond to serious and clear objective causes. 
A tendency to maximize punishment is therefore suspect.
The analysis of trends also highlights commonalities at particular 
points in the evolution of criminal legislation in the region. If we can iden-
tify common moments at which countries tend to maximize penalties, we 
may find that there is also a common cause that merits study.
For these two analyses, both the comparative and the historical, 
the laws were identified that define drug-related crimes from the 1950s 
through 2011 in each of the seven selected countries in Latin America. 
Once identified, the laws, including their content, were organized system-
atically in separate, country-specific files. Researchers from CEDD veri-
fied the information gathered for each of their countries to ensure that it 
was reliable and current, and provided access to laws that were not avail-
able via Internet or in other sources in Colombia. That information was 
subsequently supplemented with data from each country’s criminal code 
on penalties for the crimes chosen for comparison. The authors used this 
information for the comparative analysis.
Overview of criminal drug control legislation  
in Latin America
This section presents two analyses of criminal legislation defining drug-
related crimes in seven countries in the region: 1) an analysis of historical 
trends from 1950 until 2012,21 and 2) the identification of some specific 
characteristics of those trends.
 21 Although in some countries, such as Argentina, Colombia, Brazil, Mexico 
and Peru, drug crimes were defined in criminal legislation in the 1920s 
and 1930s, for a comparative analysis it is more appropriate to begin with 
the 1950s, because by then most countries had criminal drug laws, and it 
is therefore a date that marks the intensification of the war on drugs and 
the generalized use of criminal law towards that end. 
Analysis of trends in the criminalization of drugs
The first criminal legislation on drugs in Latin America was passed in 
about the 1920s and was characterized by criminalizing very few drug-
related conducts and applying relatively light penalties. In Argentina, Law 
11.309 of 1924 punished only the clandestine introduction of drugs, their 
sale and improper prescription with a penalty of six months to two years 
in prison.22 In Colombia, Law 11 of 1920 imposed fines for trafficking or 
use,23 and in Mexico, the first regulations were established in 1916, 1923 
and 1927, and included prohibitions without defining specific crimes or 
establishing prison terms.24
A review of current criminal legislation leads to the hypothesis that 
there is a tendency to maximize the use of criminal law to address the 
drug problem in Latin America. Unlike those of the 1920s, current laws 
establish severe penalties for a large number of drug-related conducts. Co-
lombia is a very good example: While the first drug control laws imposed 
only fines on only two drug-related conducts, the current Criminal Code 
includes 50 verbs used to describe a criminal offence (Descriptive Verbs, 
hereafter also referred to as descriptive verbs) – in other words, punish-
able conducts -- and includes penalties of up to 30 years in prison, which 
can be increased in the case of an aggravated offense.
In testing this hypothesis, several trends in these laws emerge in two 
specific areas: the number of drug-related conducts criminalized and the 
length, in years, of the prison terms imposed for those conducts. The fol-
lowing section examines each of those trends, indicating their character-
istics and nuances.
Gradual increase in the number of conducts  
described as criminal
From the standpoint of guarantees, criminal law is constrained by the prin-
ciple of minimal intervention.25 According to this principle, criminal law 
 22 Corda, R.A. (2010).
 23 Uprimny and Guzmán (2010).
 24 Hernández (2010).
 25 Ferrajoli (2000: 336) explains the principle of minimal intervention as jus-
tification for criminal law as follows: “A criminal system is justified only if 
the sum of the violence – crimes, retaliation and arbitrary punishment 
– that it can prevent is greater than the violence represented by unpre-
vented crimes and the penalties established for them. Such a calculation 
is, of course, impossible. But the punishment can be justified as the lesser 
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has two preventive purposes. The most obvious is to prevent crimes and 
to protect people who could be affected by those crimes; less frequently 
mentioned is the prevention of arbitrary punishment and the protection 
of defendants against unnecessary punishment.26
Exceeding the minimal use of criminal law to fulfill the first purpose 
to the detriment of the second is not permissible. The increasing crimi-
nalization of a long list of conducts, far from serving as a guarantee for the 
victims of those crimes, may only lead to victimizing those convicted of 
them. This is even more problematic considering that, in most cases, drug-
related crimes have no specific victims because those involved participate 
voluntarily in the illicit market. The heinous crimes committed by drug 
traffickers to protect their business are obviously a different matter. In 
studying drug-related criminal legislation and its evolution in the selected 
countries, we find that the tendency toward maximization of the use of 
criminal law is associated with an increase in the number of drug-related 
conducts defined as criminal since the first drug laws were passed.
evil – which is to say only if it is lesser, or less afflictive and less arbitrary 
– in comparison to other, non-juridical reactions that could be assumed to 
occur in its absence; more generally, the lower the cost of criminal law in 
comparison to the costs of punitive anarchy, the more justified the state 
monopoly on the power to punish.” 
 26  Ferrajoli (2000: 335).
This upward trend is confirmed by the number of articles in legisla-
tion in those countries that describe drug-related conducts. In most cases, 
the number increased from about two in the 1950s to what is now a broad 
array of articles describing drug-related crimes, as shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1, like the graphs that follow, is based on key laws for each 
country and the changes they represent in legislation on illegal drugs. Be-
cause laws were passed in different countries in different years, however, 
the legislative changes are presented by decade, which enables them to be 
grouped and thereby illustrate the main trends over time. The horizontal 
axis is therefore divided into decades, rather than the individual years in 
which the legislative changes were made.
This gradual and steady increase in the number of articles describ-
ing drug-related conducts as criminal is even more evident in Figure 2, 
which shows the total number of articles of criminal legislation that de-
scribe drug-related crimes in the countries studied. Each bar represents 
the number of articles describing drug-related crimes in Latin America 
during the reference period, as shown on the horizontal axis. The colors of 
the bars correspond to the countries selected for the study.
Although in some countries, such as Brazil and Mexico, the number 
of criminal articles is relatively small – no more than seven, despite some 
increase – there is a notable increase in the number of criminalized con-
ducts and in particular the number of verbs used to describe a criminal of-
fense. This represents a regional trend, or at least in the countries studied, 
where the number of articles in legislation increased from fewer than 10 
in the 1950s to nearly 100 today.
In Mexico, for example, criminal legislation on drugs has been modi-
fied through reforms to the Criminal Code. As a result, the tendency has 
been to keep the same number of articles, but to increase the number of con-
ducts described as criminal and the number of descriptive verbs included.
This suggests a problem with legislative practices in the descrip-
tion of drug-related conducts, which consists of increasing the number of 
verbs used to describe a criminal offense that are often unrelated or which 
tend to excessively expand each description of a crime or impose the same 
penalty on conducts that have very different degrees of seriousness. There 
are cases in which a definition of a crime in a specific article may include 
nearly 20 descriptive verbs.27 As a result, the number of articles in a crimi-
 27 This is the case in the first section of Article 197 of the Mexican Federal 
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Figure 1. 
Comparative evolution in the number of articles  
in criminal legislation that describe drug-related conducts
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nal law does not necessarily coincide with the number of crimes defined, 
let alone the verbs used to define a criminal offense.
This is the case in Peru. The first law analyzed, which dates from 1921, 
included a total of eight descriptive verbs in five definitions of drug-relat-
ed crimes contained in a single article of criminal legislation. The current 
Criminal Code has 11 articles criminalizing drug-related conducts, which 
include 17 descriptions of crimes and a total of 62 descriptive verbs. This 
occurs not only in Peruvian legislation, but in all of the countries studied,28 
leading to the conclusion that this problem of legislative practices result-
ing in the proliferation of articles in criminal legislation and the increasing 
number of descriptive verbs contributes to the tendency to criminalize all 
conducts related to the drug problem.
According to Zaffaroni, the proliferation of verbs used to define a 
criminal offense associated with drugs in some Latin American laws 
should not be considered a sign of great care “in the sense of ensuring 
Criminal Code of 1931, after its reform in 1978, and with the crime of 
trafficking established in Article 48 of Law 1008 of 1988 in Bolivia, which 
includes 15 descriptive verbs.
 28 For data on the trend in the numbers of articles and descriptive verbs in 
criminal legislation on drugs in Latin America, see Table 1 in the annex to 
this paper.
greater precision in the legal definition, but an effort to cover all possibili-
ties of a punitive approach.”29 This shows a desire to leave no loophole in 
criminalization and implies an “unprecedented extension of a punitive ap-
proach” that calls into question the minimal guarantees of liberal criminal 
law, including the aforementioned principle of minimal intervention of 
criminal law.
Because counting articles gives an imprecise picture, given the huge 
increase in the number of descriptive verbs included in the definitions, the 
same analysis was performed with the verbs used to describe a criminal 
offense, which more directly reflect the conducts described and penalized. 
This analysis shows even more clearly the upward trend in the number 
of criminalized conducts in the seven countries studied. Figures 3 and 4 
show that the number of drug-related criminal activities has tended to in-
crease over time.
As Figure 3 shows, the increase in the number of verbs used to define 
a criminal offense has been both steady and consistent in nearly all the 
Latin American countries studied and is even more dramatic than the in-
crease in the number of articles in criminal legislation. In some countries, 
 
 29 Zaffaroni (2009).
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Figure 2. 
Aggregate trend in number of articles on drugs  
in criminal legislation
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Figure  3.  
Comparative trends in the number of verbs used  
to describe a criminal offense
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such as Mexico, however, the upward trend is not as sharp, which could 
suggest a slower increase. Nevertheless, the increase is still consistent. The 
Figure 4 illustrating the overall trend shows that in the countries under 
study, the number of descriptive verbs – in other words, punishable con-
ducts -- increased from about 50 to more than 350 currently.
Although the line graphs (Figures 1 and 3) for the seven Latin Amer-
ican countries show a decrease in these crime categories at certain points, 
they are exceptions to the rule. The overall trend in the seven countries is 
toward an increase in penalized drug-related conducts, as shown in the bar 
graphs (Figures 2 and 4).
Even when there are substantial differences between the numbers 
of criminalized drug-related conducts in two countries (for example, 
Mexican law currently includes 36 verbs used to describe a criminal of-
fense, while Ecuadorian law contains 67), the aggregate data show that 
since 1950, there has been a general and steady increase in the number of 
criminalized drug-related activities. Proof of this is that the total number 
of descriptive verbs included in the definition of drug-related crimes in 
the seven countries rose from 67 to 344 in just 50 years (see Figure 4).
The question is whether there are sufficient objective grounds to jus-
tify this exponential increase in the number of criminalized drug-related 
conducts. Although this would require a case-by-case study of the legis-
latures’ reasons for including new drug-related articles, definitions or de-
scriptive verbs in criminal legislation, the answer, from the standpoint of 
the guarantees provided by criminal law, is negative.
The disproportionality seems clear, because instead of seeking to 
prevent drug-related conducts that are harmful to society, this increase in 
the classification of drug-related crimes reflects a desire to leave no loop-
hole in the punitive approach. The goal is to maximize the use of criminal 
law to punish all drug-related conduct, whether or not it causes harm or 
jeopardizes a protected legal interest and regardless of whether the prohi-
bitionist policy has effectively addressed the problem of abuse of psycho-
active substances, which was its original purpose.
Gradual increase in penalties for drug-related crimes
Along with the increase in criminalized drug-related conducts, penalties 
have also increased. While the first drug control laws included minor pen-
alties of up to two years in prison, or no prison term at all, those amounts 
have multiplied over the years. A trend toward longer sentences is a sec-
ond element that would suggest disproportionality in Latin American 
criminal drug control legislation.
To prove this upward trend, the lengths of sentences30 established 
for all drug-related crimes and for drug trafficking in particular were stud-
ied and compared to all laws in the seven selected Latin American coun-
tries since 1950.
First, the lengths of penalties for all drug crimes in each country’s 
legislation were analyzed, focusing specifically on the highest minimum 
penalty and the highest maximum penalty– that is, the lengths of the high-
est minimum and highest maximum sentences for all drug-related crimes 
in each country’s legislation.31 Figure 5 shows the trend toward an increase 
in the minimum penalty for drug-related crimes.
 30 The lengths of the penalties studied correspond to the simple form of each 
drug-related crime. These penalties obviously increase in cases of aggra-
vated forms of the crime, but we chose not to consider those increases 
because the legislation makes it difficult to calculate the corresponding 
amounts.
 31 For example, in current Colombian legislation, of all the drug-related 
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According to the data, the country with the most marked upward 
trend is Peru, where in less than 60 years, the highest minimum penalty 
increased from two years to 25 years. Bolivia and Mexico also have high 
minimum penalties of as much as 20 years in prison.
Analysis of the overall situation in Latin America seems to show a 
steady increase over the past 60 years. As the aggregate trend in Figure 
6 shows, the highest minimum penalties for drug-related crimes have 
increased considerably, confirming the tendency to maximize the use of 
criminal law in drug control efforts.
The highest maximum penalties follow the same trend. Figure 7, 
which compares the highest maximum penalties for drug-related crimes, 
shows that the Latin American countries in the study have tended to in-
crease their most severe sanctions. Mexico and Peru report the highest 
maximum penalties, at 40 and 35 years, respectively. Although Ecuador, 
crimes defined in the Criminal Code, the one with the longest minimum 
penalty is the crime of aggravated use, construction, commercialization 
and/or possession of semisubmersibles or submarines (Criminal Code 
Art. 377B), with a minimum of 15 years in prison. The crime of trafficking, 
manufacturing or possession of narcotics (Criminal Code Art. 376) has a 
maximum penalty of 30 years in prison, which is more severe than the 
maximum penalty for any other drug-related crime. 
Brazil and Argentina report the lowest maximum penalties in the region, 
they also show a gradual increase in the severity of sanctions.
As with the minimum penalties illustrated in Figure 6, there has been 
a steady upward trend in maximum penalties in Latin America over the past 
Ye
ar
s 
in
 P
ris
on
30
Argentina
Bolivia
Colombia
Mexico
Peru
Ecuador
Brazil
25
20
15
10
5
0
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 Current
Year
Source: Compiled by authors
Figure  5. 
Comparative trend in highest minimum penalty  
for drug-related crimes
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Figure  6. 
Aggregate trend in highest minimum penalties  
for drug-related crime
Figure 7.  
Comparative trends in highest maximum penalties  
for drug-related crimes
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60 years. Figure 8 shows the aggregate highest maximum penalties for drug-
related crimes in the countries studied. In the 1950s, the sum of the high-
est maximum penalties in the region did not exceed 50 years, but by 2011, 
it had reached nearly 200 years, an overall increase of nearly 150 percent.
The preceding statements need to be nuanced somewhat. Although 
it is difficult to speak of an upward trend in the minimum and maximum 
penalties for drug-related crimes between 1950 and 1970, there has been 
a clear increase since then. Some specific cases illustrate this.
Two examples of the minimum penalty are worth citing: 1) between 
1950 and 1970, the highest minimum penalty for various drug-related 
crimes in Peruvian legislation was two years in prison, but that rose to a min-
imum of 15 years in 1980 for the crime of promoting or organizing criminal 
gangs that engaged in drug trafficking; 2) similarly, the minimum penalty 
in Argentina until 1970 was one year in prison, but by 1980 that rose to 
five years for the crime of organizing or financing drug-related activities.
The upward trend is even clearer for the maximum penalty. As Fig-
ures 9 and 10 illustrate, between 1970 and 1980, the maximum penalties 
rose from six to 15 years in Argentina, from five to 15 years in Brazil, and 
from five to 12 years in Colombia. Similarly, between 1960 and 1970, they 
rose from two to six years in Argentina, from zero32 to 20 years in Bolivia, 
from 10 to 15 years in Mexico and from eight to 12 years in Ecuador.
 32 The first criminal law establishing drug-related crimes in Bolivia was Law 
Figure  8.  
Aggregate trend in highest maximum penalties  
for drug-related crimes
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Figure  9.  
Comparative trend in the maximum penalty  
for the crime of drug trafficking
Ye
ar
s 
in
 P
ris
on
35
Argentina
Bolivia
Colombia
Mexico
Peru
Ecuador
Brazil
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 Current
Year
Source: Compiled by authors
Figure  10.  
Aggregate trend in the maximum penalty  
for the crime of drug trafficking
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171 of January 10, 1962, so in 1950 there were no criminal penalties for 
these conducts. 
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Those trends are confirmed by analysis of the increase in penalties 
not for all drug-related crimes, but for one crime in particular: drug traf-
ficking. This punishable activity is particularly important because it is cen-
tral to the drug economy. That makes the trend in the sanction for this 
crime a good criterion for analyzing the growing repressiveness of drug 
policies.33
Penalties for drug trafficking show similar trends in drug control leg-
islation in the region. In general, penalties have increased since 1950, ex-
cept in a few cases where they have remained steady or decreased slightly. 
Only Peru is an exception as the highest maximum sentence of 15 years in 
prison established in Decree Law 11005 of 1949 remained unchanged as 
of 2012.34 At the same time, the minimum penalty decreased slightly with 
the 1991 Criminal Code, falling from 10 years in prison to eight years, the 
only time the penalty for drug trafficking was reduced.
To verify the tendency toward longer sentences for drug trafficking, 
the historical trend in the minimum, maximum and average penalties was 
graphed.35 Figure 9 shows the comparative trend in the maximum penalty 
for the crime of drug trafficking. Colombia stands out for a significant in-
crease in the length of penalties, which over 60 years rose from less than 
five years to 30 years. Mexico, which has the second-highest maximum 
penalty, also shows an upward trend, although it held steady in the last 
two decades of the period studied. Countries such as Peru and Brazil have 
also held steady in recent years after an initial upward trend.
 33 There are two other reasons for focusing specifically on the crime of drug 
trafficking: 1) it is a conduct that has been penalized since the first drug 
control laws appeared in Latin America, and 2) it has a significant impact 
on institutions, because a high percentage of the region’s prison inmates 
were sentenced for drug-related activities. on this topic, see Metaal and 
Youngers (eds.) (2010).
 34 To clarify, the military junta’s Legislative Decree 122 of 1981, better 
known as the Law of Repression of Illicit Trafficking of Drugs, established 
that trafficking would be punished by “no less than 10 years in prison,” 
without setting a maximum penalty. Because it is impossible to include 
the absence of a maximum penalty without affecting the consistency of 
the graph, and considering that this law was in effect for only three years, 
we assume here that the maximum penalty for this crime in 1980 was still 
15 years. 
 35 To clarify, these calculations correspond to penalties for simple drug traf-
ficking. Some legislation treats other trafficking-related offenses separate-
ly, and those penalties are not included here. That is the case, for example, 
with crimes such as the financing of organizations dedicated to drug traf-
ficking. 
Figure 10 shows the aggregate trend in the maximum penalties for 
the crime of drug trafficking. There is an overall upward trend in the re-
gion, although some countries have maintained their penalties without 
significant changes in the past two decades. The increase tended to be 
more significant between the 1960s and 1980s. The more drastic changes 
seen during that period may have been related to the approval of major 
international conventions on drugs (1961 and 1988) and the importance 
given to the issue in US foreign policy, especially after President Nixon 
declared the so-called war on drugs.
Analysis of the minimum penalties for drug trafficking shows great-
er dispersion in the trend among the Latin American countries studied. 
Nevertheless, a gradual increase is still evident. Ecuador seems to have 
experienced the steepest and most significant increases, although it has 
held steady over the past two decades. This recent stability in the length 
of the minimum penalty is also seen in other countries, such as Mexico, 
Argentina and even Peru. Colombia is an example of a steady increase in 
the penalty, especially since the 1970s, as Figure 11 shows.
As in the preceding cases, an overall analysis of Latin America shows 
an upward trend in the lengths of penalties. The most significant increases 
in the maximum penalty for trafficking came in the decade between 1960 
and 1970, and later around the beginning of the 1980s. Although some 
Figure  11.  
Comparative trend in the minimum penalty  
for the crime of drug trafficking
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increases have occurred since the 1990s, they have generally been smaller 
than in the earlier decades. This is reflected in Figure 12, which illustrates 
the aggregate trend in the minimum penalty for the crime of drug traffick-
ing from 1950 to 2011, the most current date in the study.
Analysis of the average penalty for drug trafficking shows more clear-
ly the steady upward trend in the sanctions, which appears more dramatic 
for particular countries at certain times. The average penalty used here 
and throughout this paper is the simple average of the maximum and min-
imum penalties and was calculated based on the penalties established in 
each country’s legislation. As Figure 13 shows, there was a steady and con-
sistent increase in most of the countries until the 1990s and the lengths 
of penalties have held fairly steady since then, except in Colombia, where 
there have been further significant increases.
Figures 9, 11 and 13, which show the comparative trend in the 
maximum, minimum and average penalties for the crime of drug traffick-
ing, confirm that only Peruvian legislation has not followed the general 
trend of increasing penalties. But they also show a generalized practice of 
punishing drug trafficking more severely over time in all seven countries. 
While in 1950, the average penalty for this crime was not even five years 
(except in Peru, where it was 8.5 years), it currently ranges from 10 to 20 
years in prison.
Figures 10 and 12, which show the aggregate trend in the maximum 
and minimum penalties for drug trafficking, point to the same conclu-
sion. While in 1950, the sum of the penalties in the seven countries was 
34 years for the maximum and 4.5 years for the minimum, with an average 
penalty of 19.25 years, those figures are now 141 years, 59.7 years and 
100.4 years, respectively. That means that in just over 60 years, the aggre-
gate maximum penalty increased by 415 percent, the minimum by 1,327 
percent and the average by 521 percent.
This specific analysis of penalties for drug trafficking confirms the 
upward trend that is evident in penalties for all drug-related crimes. Taken 
together, these data lead to the conclusion that since 1950 in Latin Ameri-
ca, there has been a generalized tendency to increase the lengths of penal-
ties for drug-related crimes.
This increase in penalties would be justified if there were a corre-
sponding increase in the harm associated with drug-related crimes. Pro-
portionality is maintained only if there is both an increase in the penalties 
and an increase in the seriousness and harm associated with the crimes 
that those more severe sanctions are meant to punish. If the harm did not 
increase, the increase in the punishment would not be justified, because 
there would be no objective grounds for more severe punishment.
That is the case with drug-related crime. These are offenses that do 
not result in direct harm except in cases such as supplying drugs to mi-
nors. It is impossible to demonstrate empirically that cocaine trafficking is 
Figure 13.  
Comparative trends in the average penalty  
for the crime of drug trafficking
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Figure  12.  
Aggregate trend in the minimum penalty  
for the crime of drug trafficking
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more serious now than it was in 1950, because it does not result in direct 
harm. Crimes committed by drug traffickers to protect and regulate their 
illegal business, such as murders and bribery -- whose seriousness has 
clearly increased -- are another matter. But the seriousness of those other 
crimes is different from the seriousness of the production and trafficking 
of controlled substances. And the upward trend in punishments, from five 
years in prison to 15 or 30 years, indicates the disproportionality associ-
ated with drug-related crimes.
It may be argued that these upward trends are not specific to drug-
related crimes, but reflect a general punitive tendency in Latin American 
countries. Although this potential critique does not change the issue of 
proportionality, we have chosen to consider it separately. Therefore, an 
additional element of analysis is offered, which is the comparison of pen-
alties for drug-related crimes with the maximum penalties allowed by 
criminal legislation in each country.
Table 1 shows this comparison for 2012, because the difficulty of 
obtaining earlier criminal codes in all of the selected countries made it 
impossible to gather the data needed to compare trends. We therefore 
compare only the maximum penalty allowed in each country, the longest 
maximum penalty for all drug-related crimes, and the maximum specifi-
cally for the crime of drug trafficking.
Bolivia and Peru are emblematic cases. In those countries, some 
drug-related crimes are punished with the most severe penalty allowed 
by the legal system. That would mean, in theory, that they are the most 
serious crimes in criminal legislation. As noted, however, they are actually 
crimes in which the harm is not clear and which are considerably less seri-
ous than murder, which will be discussed below.
This would suggest that drug-related crimes are characterized by a 
more intensive punitive approach that is part of a general tendency to use 
punitive measures that seems more or less common to all Latin American 
criminal legislation, or, in other words, a disproportionality within the 
general disproportionality that exists for other crimes. As shown in the 
next section, however, the disproportionality tends to be greater for drug-
related crimes than for other crimes.
This punitive approach within a punitive approach is most evident 
in Colombia and Mexico. These two countries have the longest possible 
maximum penalties of the seven countries studied, with maximum sanc-
tions of 60 years, reflecting the punitive nature of their criminal legisla-
tion. Although they are not very long compared to the maximum possible 
sentence, penalties for drug-related crimes are equal to or longer than the 
maximum penalties in most of the other countries. So not only is there a 
general tendency toward a punitive approach overall in these countries, 
but within that can be found a particular and specific manifestation of the 
punitive approach: the disproportionality in the treatment of drug-related 
crimes.
Analysis of criminal proportionality  
in the abstract sense
The discussion so far points to similar tendencies in Latin America with 
regard to various conducts defined as crimes and the lengths of penalties 
for drug-related crimes. These include a steady increase in the number 
of conducts penalized, the lack of good legislative practices in changing 
legislation on sensitive issues, and the increase in the lengths of both the 
minimum and maximum penalties. These, in turn, seem to indicate a ten-
dency toward maximization of the use of criminal law in drug control ef-
forts, which raises questions about basic guarantees for defendants under 
criminal law.
This section analyzes proportionality in the strict sense. As indicated 
in the section on conceptual boundaries, we compare the way in which 
countries in the region have defined drug-related crimes and other crimes 
that are clearly serious and have an impact on society: murder (homicido 
simple), rape (violación) and aggravated robbery (hurto con violencia sobre 
TAble 1.  
Comparison of maximum penalty and penalties  
for drug-related crimes, 2012
Penalty/ 
country
maximum 
penalty
maximum penalty for all 
drug-related crimes
maximum penalty  
for drug trafficking
Argentina 35 20 15
Bolivia 30 30 25
Colombia 60 30 30
Mexico 60 40 25
Peru 35 35 15
Ecuador 35 16 16
Brazil 30 20 15
Source: Compiled by authors
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la persona).36 Although legislation in different countries uses different ter-
minology, information was gathered about the conducts and sanctions cor-
responding to these crimes covering the period from 1970 to the present.37
The underlying assumption is that the offenses chosen for compari-
son, especially murder and rape, are clearly serious acts that cause consid-
erable individual and social harm. In fact, they could be considered more 
serious crimes than drug trafficking alone. The closer the penalty for traf-
ficking is to the penalty for those crimes, therefore, the more dispropor-
tionate it can be considered.
Although all forms of aggravated robbery may not be considered 
more serious than drug trafficking, it is included because it has a high 
social impact and there tends to be significant public pressure for more 
severe punishment. It is therefore useful for illustrating that even in com-
parison to crimes with a high societal impact, penalties for trafficking tend 
to be extremely severe in most of the region’s countries. The following sec-
tion discusses the results of the comparisons.
Drug trafficking compared to murder
For the comparison, the length of penalties for drug trafficking as a per-
centage of the length of penalties for murder is considered. The logical as-
sumption is that punishment for murder cannot be similar to penalties for 
trafficking, because murder is clearly more serious, as it results in concrete 
harm to a protected legal right of great social importance – human life and 
personal integrity.
A comparison of the increase in penalties for the two crimes in re-
cent decades therefore indicates whether the criminalization of drug-re-
lated crimes is excessive, starting from the premise: The closer the penalty 
 36 Aggravated robbery is defined as the taking of money or goods in the pos-
session of another, from his or her person or immediate presence, by force 
or intimidation.
 37 Unlike the calculations for the previous section of this paper, the period 
covered in the comparative analysis of different types of crimes begins not 
in 1950, but in 1970. The reason for this change is the difficulty in obtain-
ing copies of the criminal legislation that was in effect in each country in 
1950, which included the crimes of murder, rape and aggravated robbery. 
We do not believe that this affects the analysis, however, because as noted 
above, the lengths of penalties for drug trafficking began to increase nota-
bly as of the 1970s. Because we were unable to obtain data about criminal 
laws in Ecuador in 1970 and Peru in 1970 and 1990, this information is 
represented as zero in the graphs of this part of the text. 
for drug-related crimes is to the penalty for murder, the greater the dispro-
portionality. Landmark laws from each country are used to answer the fol-
lowing question: If the penalty for the crime of murder is given a value of 
100 percent, what corresponding percentage is represented by the penalty 
for drug trafficking? This exercise is repeated for the maximum, minimum 
and average penalties for the crimes being compared.
As Figure 14 shows, in the case of the maximum penalty, the coun-
tries with the greatest disproportionality are Bolivia, Colombia and Ec-
uador.
According to Figure 14, the maximum penalty for drug trafficking 
is currently greater than the most severe penalty for the crime of murder 
in three of the seven countries studied: Bolivia, Ecuador and Mexico.38 
In Colombia, the maximum penalty for drug trafficking was equal to 133 
percent of the maximum penalty for homicide in 1990, while in Bolivia it 
was 250 percent.
Except in Bolivia and Colombia, none of the legislation studied 
shows a decrease in the percentage of the maximum penalty for drug traf-
 38 In Bolivia, the maximum penalty for trafficking is currently 25 years in pris-
on, while the maximum for murder is 20. In Mexico, the maximum penalty 
for trafficking is 25 years, while the maximum for murder is 24; and in Ec-
uador, while the maximum penalty for trafficking is 16 years, the maximum 
for murder is 12 years in prison.
Figure  14.  
Maximum penalty for trafficking as percentage of maximum 
penalty for murder (1970-2012)
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Figure 15.  
Minimum penalty for trafficking as percentage  
of minimum penalty for murder (1970-2012)
ficking in comparison to the maximum penalty for murder. The case of 
Mexico illustrates what could be an upward trend in this percentage in 
Latin American legislation since 1970, as it rose from 60 percent in 1970 
to 85 percent in 1990 and 104 percent in 2012.
While the percentage relationship declined between 1990 and 2012 
in the exceptional cases of Bolivia and Colombia, that did not imply a 
reduction in the maximum penalty for drug trafficking. On the contrary, 
in Bolivia, that penalty remained the same over that period (25 years in 
prison), while the maximum penalty for murder increased (from 10 years 
to 20 years in prison). In Colombia, both penalties increased. The penalty 
for trafficking rose from 20 years to 30 years in prison, while for murder, it 
increased from 15 to 37.5 years. A decrease in the percentage alone there-
fore does not necessarily imply a decrease in the repressive use of criminal 
law in the case of drug trafficking.
A comparison of minimum penalties produces similar results. In 
three countries – Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru – the minimum penalty for 
drug trafficking is currently higher than the minimum penalty for mur-
der.39 Bolivia showed the greatest disproportionality in 1990, when the 
 39 In Bolivia, the minimum penalty for trafficking is 10 years in prison, while 
the minimum for murder is five years. In Ecuador, the minimum for traffick-
ing is 12 years, while the minimum for murder is eight years. And in Peru, 
minimum penalty for drug trafficking (10 years in prison) was 10 times 
the minimum for murder (one year in prison).
The only substantial decrease in penalties occurred in Bolivia. The 
reason for this change in legislation between 1990 and 2012 was the same 
as in the case of the average penalty: while the minimum penalty for traf-
ficking remained unchanged, the minimum for murder increased consid-
erably. In addition, in cases such as that of Colombia, although the per-
centage seemed proportionate over the last several decades (60 percent 
and 61 percent), the minimum penalty for drug trafficking is particularly 
high (10.6 years in prison40), preventing judges from opting for a lighter 
sentence in cases in which the conduct is less serious.
Finally, the average penalty allows analysis of the overall trend in leg-
islation on both maximum and minimum penalties for the crimes being 
compared. Figure 16 shows what was already analyzed in the preceding 
the minimum penalty for drug trafficking is eight years, while the minimum 
for murder is six years.
 40 This does not take into account the penalty for dealing small amounts of 
drugs, which has a prison term of 5.3 years. The same is true for calcula-
tion of the maximum and average penalty in the other comparisons in this 
report.
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Figure 16. 
Average penalty for trafficking as percentage  
of average penalty for murder (1970-2012)
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for rape and for drug trafficking is therefore useful for identifying dispro-
portionate treatment of drug-related crimes.
The same type of percentage comparison is used as was used for 
murder. A percentage nearly equal to or exceeding 100 percent would 
confirm disproportionate punishment for drug-related crimes. In theory, 
to ensure at least minimal protection for the principle of proportional-
ity of punishment, penalties for rape should be substantially more severe 
than for drug trafficking, given the greater seriousness of the crime. If that 
is not the case, it confirms the disproportionality that was evident in com-
paring drug-related crimes to murder.
Figures, 17, 18 and 19 illustrate the trend in the percentage repre-
sented by the maximum, minimum and average penalties, respectively, for 
drug trafficking, compared to those for the crime of rape.
As the preceding graph shows, the disproportionate treatment of 
drug-related crimes is much more obvious when compared with the crime 
of rape. In all of the countries studied, the maximum penalty for drug traf-
ficking is currently equal to or greater than the maximum for rape. The 
smallest percentage currently is in Argentina (100 percent), where the 
maximum penalty for both is 15 years in prison, and Ecuador (100 per-
cent), where the same penalty is 16 years.
graphs: The general rule is an increase in the penalty for trafficking as a 
percentage of the penalty for murder.
Bolivia and Colombia remain the only cases in which there is a de-
crease in that percentage, which, as noted above, responds not to a de-
crease in the penalty for trafficking, but to a considerable increase in the 
penalty for murder, which, in Colombia, is accompanied by an increase 
in the penalty for trafficking. In Mexico and Brazil, there is a clear upward 
trend from 1970 to 2012, while in Ecuador, the penalty for trafficking has 
been 1.4 times as great as the penalty for murder since 1990.
These three graphs confirm the disproportionality of the punish-
ment of drug-related crimes such as trafficking in comparison to a very 
serious crime such as murder. Except in Argentina -- where the average 
penalty for trafficking represents 58 percent of the average for the crime of 
murder and has held steady since 1990 -- the legislation in the countries 
analyzed has taken an increasingly repressive approach to drug-related 
crimes.
Between 1990 and 2012, five of the seven countries studied (Bolivia, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico and Peru) at some point considered longer 
penalties (maximum, minimum or average) for the crime of drug traffick-
ing than those established for murder. The logic was the same in Brazil, 
as the average penalty for drug trafficking, as a percentage of the average 
for murder, has increased from 23 percent in 1970 to 77 percent in 2012.
Between 1970 and 2012, therefore, criminal legislation in Latin 
America has tended to entrench disproportionality in the treatment of 
drug-related crimes. Unlike murder, which clearly has serious conse-
quences for society, drug-related crimes cause no concrete, direct harm. 
However, the legislation studied does not reflect this difference in the 
seriousness associated with each conduct, since it is not unusual in the 
countries studied for drug-related crimes to be punished as severely as or 
more severely than the crime of murder.
Drug trafficking compared to rape
Rape is a very serious crime, considering its concrete and specific harm to 
a person’s sexual freedom and integrity.41 A comparison between penalties 
 41 Rape is a crime that implies the use of sexual violence and constitutes 
an attack against the victim’s sexual freedom and integrity. Unlike drug-
related crimes, it causes concrete harm, both physical and psychological, 
which can have repercussions for the person’s life in society. 
Figure  17.  
Maximum penalty for trafficking as percentage  
of maximum penalty for rape (1970-2012)
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In the other countries, the maximum penalty for drug-related crimes 
is considerably higher than that for the crime against sexual freedom and 
integrity. In Mexico, the percentage comparison is 179 percent, followed 
by Bolivia with 167 percent, and Colombia and Brazil with 150 percent. 
The disproportionality of these maximum penalties was highest in 1990, 
when the penalty for trafficking in Bolivia and Colombia was 2.5 times 
the maximum for rape.42 The data therefore show that the difference in the 
seriousness of these two offenses is not reflected proportionately in their 
maximum penalties, because the punishment for drug-related crimes 
seems much more severe than the punishment for such an extremely 
harmful crime as rape.
While the comparison of maximum penalties reached 250 percent, 
the minimum penalty comparison exceeded that percentage by a wide 
margin. In four countries, the minimum penalty for drug trafficking was 
three or four times as long as the minimum for rape. Bolivia, Colombia, Ec-
uador and Mexico showed the greatest discrepancies in penalties for drug-
related crimes as compared to those for rape, especially in 1970 and 1990.
In five of the seven countries studied, the minimum penalties are 
currently longer for drug trafficking than for rape. The greatest dispropor-
tionality is in Bolivia, where the minimum penalty for drug-related crimes 
is twice that of rape; while the former is 10 years in prison, the latter is five 
years. Although not reflected fully in the comparative percentage, Ecua-
dor and Colombia have the highest minimum penalties for drug traffick-
ing, at 12 years in prison for Ecuador and 10.6 years for Colombia.
As with the study of the maximum and minimum penalties, analysis 
of the average penalties also shows that those for drug-related crimes are 
disproportionate. Only in Argentina is the penalty slightly higher for rape 
(10.5 years in prison) than for drug trafficking (9.5 years in prison). In the 
other six countries, the average penalty for drug trafficking is equal to or 
greater than the average for rape. Bolivia and Mexico – where the percent-
age comparison is 175 percent and 164 percent, respectively – stand out 
in particular.
Most countries registered the greatest disproportionality in 1990. 
With the excpetion of Argentina, in all countries the average penalty was 
 42 In Bolivia, the maximum penalty for drug trafficking was 25 years in 1990, 
while the maximum for rape was 10 years in prison. In Colombia, the maxi-
mum penalties were 20 years for drug trafficking and eight years for rape.
Figure  19.  
Average penalty for trafficking as percentage  
of average penalty for rape (1970-2012)
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Figure  18.  
Minimum penalty for trafficking  
as percentage of minimum penalty for rape (1970-2012)
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longer for drug trafficking. In Colombia, the penalty for drug trafficking 
was 13 years in prison, compared to five years for rape. In Bolivia, there 
was a difference of 10.5 years in prison in 1990.
These three graphs lead to the conclusion that drug trafficking has 
been punished more severely than rape in most countries, especially be-
tween 1990 and 2012. Although the disproportionality was greater in 
1990, that does not mean the situation has changed much. As the graphs 
show, in 2012, penalties for drug trafficking were not at all proportionate 
to those for a sex crime as serious as rape, a sign that the countries con-
tinue to impose more severe punishments for less serious crimes.
As with the crime of murder, the disproportionality of the treatment 
of drug-related crimes is evident when compared with penalties for rape, 
although the latter crime seriously affects two of the legal rights most im-
portant to society: sexual freedom and integrity. By punishing drug-re-
lated crimes such as trafficking more severely, Latin American legislation 
contradicts the principle of proportionality of punishment.
A clarification is in order here. These conclusions should not lead 
us to think that the solution to this disproportionality is to increase the 
lengths of the penalties for the crimes used for comparison (murder and 
rape), because that would only mean taking an even more punitive ap-
proach, with the costs that this implies in terms of reasonable criminal 
policy and human rights. Instead, it should lead to an evaluation of the 
actual harm caused by drug-related crimes and how to respond to that 
harm in a way that is reasonable and proportionate.
Drug trafficking compared to aggravated robbery
The last crime we compared – aggravated robbery – does not cause as se-
rious harm as murder or rape, but has a considerable impact on society, 
because it occurs so frequently. Once again, a percentage comparison is 
used, analyzing the length of the penalty for drug trafficking as a percent-
age of the penalty for aggravated robbery. Because the latter is considered 
a more serious offense, the principle of proportionality implies that it 
should be punished more severely than drug trafficking.
Figures 20, 21 and 22 show the trend in this percentage in the maxi-
mum, minimum and average penalties, respectively.
This time, the difference is much more obvious. In all of the coun-
tries, including Argentina and Brazil, which had previously appeared to 
be exceptions, drug trafficking is currently punished much more severely 
than aggravated robbery. The percentages are as high as 500 percent in 
Bolivia and 267 percent in Ecaudor. In other words, penalties for drug 
trafficking can be five times as long as penalties for aggravated robbery.
Only Colombia and Ecuador show a decrease in that disproportion-
ality between 1990 and 2012. In Ecuador, that is because the maximum 
penalty for aggravated robbery increased by one year (from five years in 
prison to six), while the maximum for drug trafficking remained at 16 
years. In Colombia, far from being the start of a decrease in dispropor-
tionality, the trend demonstrates the maximization of the use of criminal 
law, as penalties for both crimes increased considerably between 1990 and 
2012: Drug trafficking increased from 20 to 30 years in prison, while ag-
gravated robbery increased from eight to 14 years.
The minimum penalty for aggravated robbery tends to be very low in 
some countries; for example, it is one month in Argentina, six months in 
Mexico and one year in Bolivia. In comparison, the corresponding penal-
ties for drug trafficking are excessive. In these three countries, the mini-
mum penalty for drug trafficking is four years in prison in Argentina and 
10 years in Mexico and Bolivia. This explains why the percentage compar-
ison shows figures as exorbitant as 4,000 percent in Argentina and 2,000 
percent in Mexico.
Figure  20.  
Maximum penalty for trafficking as percentage  
of maximum penalty for aggravated robbery (1970-2012) 
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Figure  22.  
Average penalty for trafficking as percentage of the average 
penalty for aggravated robbery (1970-2012)
Even in countries where the minimum penalty for aggravated rob-
bery is relatively high, drug trafficking is still punished more severely. That 
is true in Colombia, which currently has the highest minimum penalty 
for aggravated robbery of the group of countries studied. While the mini-
mum penalty for aggravated robbery is six years in prison, the minimum 
for drug trafficking is 10.6 years. The situation is similar in Peru, Brazil and 
Ecuador.
Not surprisingly, the percentages in the comparison of average pen-
alties are extremely high. All seven countries currently punish drug traf-
ficking more severely than aggravated robbery. The widest margin is in 
Bolivia, where the average penalty for aggravated robbery is three years in 
prison, while the average penalty for trafficking is 17.5 years.
Only in Colombia and Ecuador did the average penalty for traffick-
ing as a percentage of the penalty for aggravated robbery decrease be-
tween 1990 and 2012. Again, however, that change did not result from a 
decrease in the severity of sanctions for drug trafficking. On the contrary, 
that penalty remained unchanged in Ecuador during the period, while it 
increased slight in Colombia. As with the other comparisons, the decrease 
in the percentage does not imply a decrease in the maximum use of crimi-
nal law.
This analysis confirms that in the seven countries studied, there is a 
generalized practice of establishing much more severe penalties for drug 
trafficking than for aggravated robbery, re-affirming the disproportional-
ity of the treatment of drug-related crimes that was illustrated in the pre-
ceding comparisons. The disproportionality evident in the comparison 
with murder became even more apparent in the comparison to rape and 
was definitively confirmed in the comparison to aggravated robbery. In 
all three cases, the prinicple of proportionality of punishment is ignored, 
because a less serious crime is punished more severely. That is not only 
unreasonable, but it also calls into question the standards by which soci-
ety judges these offenses.
It is difficult to argue that society prefers to punish a drug traffick-
er more severely than a rapist or murderer, especially in Latin American 
countries like the ones studied, where those crimes may be related to 
armed conflict, as in Colombia, or high levels of criminal violence, as in 
Mexico. More severe punishment for drug-related crimes such as traffick-
ing, therefore, contradicts the views of society and the principle of pro-
portionality in criminal law.
Figure  21.  
Minimum penalty for trafficking as percentage of minimum 
penalty for aggravated robbery (1970-2012) 
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These data suggest that Latin American legislation violates the prin-
ciple of proportionality described by Ferrajoli (2000, 402), which states 
that “if two crimes are punished with the same penalty, it means the legislative 
branch considers the seriousness to be equivalent, while if the penalty for one 
crime is more severe than that established for the other, the first crime is consid-
ered more serious than the second.” In this case, the opposite is true: the less 
serious crime is punished with a penalty equal to or exceeding the penalty 
for the more serious crime.
In conclusion, disproportionality in the punishment of drug-related 
crimes in Latin American legislation is evident since 1970. This practice 
is generalized in the seven countries studied and reached a peak in 1990, 
although that does not imply a change in approach, as explained above.
Conclusions
Proportionality in penalties is not just a principle associated with the pos-
tulates of criminal law as a mechanism of last resort and of minimum crim-
inal law, but it also constitutes a substantive guarantee for defendants and 
people convicted under criminal legislation. It protects those who play the 
weakest role in the criminal process and maintains a balance between the 
goal of protecting potential victims through the prevention of additional 
crimes and the goal of protecting possible defendants against unjust and 
excessive punishment.
Any state policy that uses criminal law must therefore respect and 
guarantee strict compliance with the principle of proportionality. Other-
wise, various human rights would be violated, which is unacceptable in 
constitutional regimes. Latin American countries, in particular, should do 
all they can to ensure that drug policies are a proportional response that 
guarantee respect for the rights of all actors related to any phase of the 
drug business.
This study, however, provides sufficient grounds to conclude that 
the trend in drug control policy in the region is toward the maximum 
use of criminal law and a consequent disproportionality in the treatment 
of drug-related crimes. This tendency is evident in the fact that both the 
number of drug-related conducts penalized and the lengths of the penal-
ties have increased steadily since 1950. This has degenerated into such a 
punitive approach that in a single body of legislation, 50 or more drug-
related conducts are penalized and penalties of 30 or more years in prison 
are imposed.
The disproportionality in drug policies in Latin America is con-
firmed by a comparison to other crimes that societies consider more se-
rious and that cause far greater, more concrete and more direct harm to 
protected legal interests. The punitive response to drug-related crimes is 
equal to or more severe than the penalties established for the crimes of 
murder, rape and aggravated robbery. The greater severity of penalties for 
drug-related crimes not only ignores proportionality, but also contradicts 
the Latin American social sensibility that would rather punish a murderer 
or rapist than a person who deals or uses drugs.
This study has also corroborated at least two other characteristics 
of criminal drug legislation in Latin America that help maintain and ex-
pand disproportionality. The first is the generalized presence of deficien-
cies in legislative practices that could hamper protection of the rights of 
people charged with and convicted of drug crimes, such as the tendency 
to include a large number of verbs used to describe a criminal offense in a 
single article of the law, which leads to the same penalty being imposed for 
crimes with different degrees of seriousness. The second is the existence 
of a punitive approach (in drug legislation) within a punitive approach 
(in the criminal justice system in general), which was identified by the 
similarity between sanctions for drug-related conducts and the maximum 
penalties established in criminal law.
Given this obvious disproportionality in the treatment of drug-relat-
ed crimes in Latin America, there is an urgent need for countries to take 
adequate measures to change the situation and implement drug policies 
that respect human rights and basic criminal guarantees.
Reinforcing this, the people most affected by the disproportional-
ity of crimes and penalties tend to be the most vulnerable members of 
Latin American societies and the weakest links in the trafficking chain. As 
was documented in the study, Systems Overload: Drug Laws and Prisons in 
Latin America, the criminalization of the cultivation, manufacturing, com-
mercialization, trafficking and even use of controlled substances generally 
involves people who live in more precarious socio-economic conditions 
and have less formal education. They also tend to constitute the weakest 
links in the drug business.43
 43 This was confirmed by an earlier CEDD study that concluded that the main 
victims of excessively repressive drug control policies are low-income peo-
ple with little formal education, who play a smaller role in the drug cycle 
and are easily replaced in the various phases of the drug economy. See 
48 49 Addicted to punishment Dejusticia Working Paper 1
And although the serious effects of prohibitionist policies on human 
rights and constitutional guarantees are enough to justify a call for them 
to be restructured, the high costs and low return in utilitarian terms mean 
the drug problem must be addressed from a different perspective. In an-
other study, CEDD quantified many of these costs, which are added to the 
huge collateral costs of violence associated with large criminal and drug-
trafficking organizations that have affected Latin American countries so 
seriously.44 There is no justification, in terms of rights or economics, for 
maintaining a punitive approach to drug policy in the region.
It is therefore crucial to make every possible effort to refocus drug 
policy in the region. Criminal punishment can no longer be the main ap-
proach. Because of the vulnerability and lack of protection for human 
rights that has resulted, countries must implement alternative responses 
to the problem of drugs. They should favor harm-reduction policies over 
punitive policies; the weak links in the drug chain must receive govern-
ment protection rather than excessive punishment, and the possible harm 
associated with psychoactive substances should be minimized through an 
approach based on public health and alternative development, not crimi-
nal punishment and the use of force.
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ANNEX
TAble 1.  
Comparative evolution in the number  
of criminalized drug-related conducts in latin America
Year 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2012
Argentina
Criminal 
Articles 1 1 1 6 15 15 13
Descriptive 
Verbs* 4 4 4 34 62 62 52
Bolivia
Criminal 
Articles 0 0 8 8 25 25 25
Descriptive 
Verbs 0 0 12 12 52 52 52
Brazil
Criminal 
Articles 1 1 1 5 5 5 7
Descriptive 
Verbs 17 17 30 54 54 54 57
Colombia
Criminal 
Articles 2 2 2 7 9 12 12
Descriptive 
Verbs 9 9 9 25 33 38 50
Ecuador
Criminal 
Articles 0 5 8 8 25 25 23
Descriptive 
Verbs 0 9 20 20 72 72 67
Mexico
Criminal 
Articles 2 2 5 4 4 5 8
Descriptive 
Verbs 17 17 33 35 35 32 36
Peru
Criminal 
Articles 2 2 3 4 6 9 11
Descriptive 
Verbs 20 20 24 24 26 34 62
Source: Compiled by authors
 * As we said in the main text, by descriptive verb we mean the verb used 
to describe a criminal offence (verbo rector), in other words, punishable 
conducts.
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TAble 2.  
Highest minimum penalty for all drug crimes in each 
country’s criminal legislation (1950 – Current)  
[Years in prison]
País/año 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 current
Argentina 0,5 0,5 1 5 8 8 8
Bolivia 0 0 6 6 20 20 20
Colombia 0,5 0,5 0,5 3 6 6 15
Mexico 6 6 6 7 10 20 20
Peru 2 2 2 15 15 25 25
Ecuador 0 4 8 8 12 12 12
Brazil 1 1 1 3 3 3 8
Source: Compiled by authors
TAble 3. 
Highest maximum penalty  for all drug crimes in each 
country’s criminal legislation (1950 – Current)  
[Years in prison]
country/Year 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 current
Argentina 2 2 6 15 20 20 20
Bolivia 0 0 20 20 30 30 30
Colombia 5 5 5 12 12 12 30
Mexico 10 10 15 15 25 40 40
Peru 15 15 15 15 15 35 35
Ecuador 0 8 12 12 16 16 16
Brazil 5 5 5 15 15 15 20
Source: Compiled by authors
TAble 4.  
Minimum penalty for drug trafficking (1950-Current)  
[Years in prison]
country/Year 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 current
Argentina 0,5 0,5 1 3 4 4 4
Bolivia 0 0 3 3 10 10 10
Colombia 0,5 0,5 0,5 3 4 8 10,7
Mexico 0,5 0,5 3 7 10 10 10
Peru 2 2 2 10 10 8 8
Ecuador 0 4 8 8 12 12 12
Brazil 1 1 1 3 3 3 5
Source: Compiled by authors
TAble 5.  
Maximum penalty for drug trafficking (1950 – Current)  
[Years in prison]
country/Year 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 current
Argentina 2 2 6 12 15 15 15
Bolivia 0 0 10 10 25 25 25
Colombia 5 5 5 12 12 20 30
Mexico 7 7 12 15 25 25 25
Peru 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
Ecuador 0 8 8 12 16 16 16
Brazil 5 5 5 15 15 15 15
Source: Compiled by authors
TAble 6.  
Average penalty for drug trafficking (1950 – Current)  
[Years in prison]
country/Year 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 current
Argentina 1,25 1,25 3,5 7,5 9,5 9,5 9,5
Bolivia 0 0 6,5 6,5 17,5 17,5 17,5
Colombia 2,75 2,75 2,75 7,5 8 14 20,35
Mexico 3,75 3,75 7,5 11 17,5 17,5 17,5
Peru 8,5 8,5 8,5 12,5 12,5 11,5 11,5
Ecuador 0 6 8 10 14 14 14
Brazil 3 3 3 9 9 9 10
Source: Compiled by authors
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